University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1994

Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial
Assistance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement:
Enforcing a Good Faith Standard
Julie Gyurci

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gyurci, Julie, "Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial Assistance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement: Enforcing a Good
Faith Standard" (1994). Minnesota Law Review. 1722.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1722

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial
Assistance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement:
Enforcing a Good Faith Standard
Julie Gyurci
A substantial assistance motion by the government permits
a departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") for a defendant who provides substantial assistance in
the prosecution or investigation of another person.1 The substantial assistance departure constitutes the most important exception to mandatory minimum sentences; 2 fifteen percent of all
defendants sentenced under the Guidelines receive substantial
assistance departures. 3 Yet, no clear standards exist governing
the use of substantial assistance motions by prosecutors. 4 In
Wade v. United States,5 the Supreme Court recently held that
sentencing courts may make a substantial assistance departure
only on a motion by the government and that courts may review
the government's refusal to bring a substantial assistance motion only if the government based the refusal on a constitution1. U.S. SENTENCING COMMuSSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN5K1.1 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].

UAL§

Substantial assistance departures comprised over 71% of all downward
CONMMSSION, 1992 ANNuAL REPORT
125 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 ANNuAL REPORT]. Courts lack discretion in sentencing under both statutory mandatory minimum sentences and the Sentencing Guidelines. Substantial assistance motions can offset both statutory
mandatory minimum sentences and Guideline range sentences. See infra note
35 and accompanying text (noting that a motion under § 5K1.1 in all but one
circuit allows courts to depart from statutory mandatory minimum sentence).
Accordingly, this Note uses the term "mandatory minimum sentences" loosely
to refer both to sentences required by the Sentencing Guidelines and statutes.
3. 1992 ANNuAL REPORT, supranote 2, at 127. In addition, over 25% of all
defendants in federal drug trafficking cases receive substantial assistance departures. Drug trafficking offenses currently comprise over 41% of all Guidelines cases. Id. at 45.
4. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistency
regarding use of substantial assistance motions).
2.

departures in fiscal 1992. U.S. SENTENCING

5.

112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992).
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ally impermissible motive. 6 The Supreme Court specifically
noted, however, that the defendant in Wade did not assist the
government pursuant to a plea agreement.7 The federal circuits
subsequently split over whether the holding applies to cases involving plea agreements in which the government reserves discretion to determine whether a defendant's cooperation merits a
substantial assistance motion.8
Mandatory minimum sentences generate an enormous
amount of commentary and controversy. 9 No commentators,
6. Id. at 1843-44. For example, courts could review a prosecutor's refusal
to request a substantial assistance departure if the prosecutor based the refusal
on the defendant's race or religion. Id. at 1844. A court also can grant relief to
the defendant if the government's refusal to move for a downward departure is
"not rationally related to any legitimate government objective." Id.
7. The defendant in Wade did not rely on "any agreement on the Government's behalf to file a substantial assistance motion." Id. at 1843.
8. In a plea agreement, the government typically reserves discretion to
make a substantial assistance motion in the following manner:
At or before the time of sentencing, the United States will advise the
Court of any "substantial assistance" provided by [the defendant] in
the ... investigation... or in the prosecution of another person who
has committed a criminal offense. The United States may, but shall
not be required to, make a motion requesting the court to depart from
the sentencing range called for by the Guidelines. This decision shall
be in the sole discretion of the United States Attorney.
United States v. Romsey, 975 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting plea
agreement).
For the split among federal circuits, compare United States v. GarciaBonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1993) (permitting review for constitutionally
impermissible motivation only); United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1502
(l1th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1993)
(same); United States v. Romsey, 975 F.2d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1992) (same);
United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 357 (1992); United States v. Sims, 1992 WL 190909, *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1992) (per curiam) (same) with United States v. Profeta, 1993 WL 185730, *1
(D.C. Cir. May 20, 1993) (permitting courts to review for good faith), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 741 (1994); United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1569
(10th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1855 (1993); United States v.
Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486-87 (2d Cir. 1992) (same).
9. For example, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated recently that
mandatory minimums are "perhaps a good example of the law of unintended
consequences." The Problems With MandatoryMinimum Sentences, 77 JUDmcATuRE 124, 124 (1993). One editorial calls mandatory minimums a "meat-ax approach to a task that demands fairness and precision." Id. at 125. Critics
attack in particular the high sentences for first-time, low-level, non-violent
drug offenders. Bill Rankin, PrisonSentences Set in Stone: A Deterrent or an
Injustice?, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Oct. 17, 1993, at Al. For example, one
twenty-year-old woman was sentenced to ten years in prison for telling a government informant where to find her boyfriend to consummate an LSD sale.
Id. Yet in light of growing public concerns about crime, legislators hesitate to
make changes, "lest opponents tag them as soft on crime." The Problems With
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, supra, at 124.
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however, have examined the confusion remaining after Wade in
cases involving substantial assistance motions pursuant to plea
agreements.' 0 Criminal defendants surrender constitutional
rights in entering a guilty plea" and frequently incur substantial risks in fulfilling a cooperation agreement. 12 Disturbingly, a
growing number of federal circuits disregard the fundamental
rights of defendants in the interpretation of plea agreements
3
and refuse to investigate allegations of prosecutorial bad faith.'
This Note describes the inconsistency in the approaches
that the federal circuits use and asserts that the application of
an objective good faith standard to plea agreements will protect
the rights of defendants and produce greater uniformity. Part I
outlines the goals of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, illustrates the purposes of substantial assistance motions, and describes plea bargaining under the Guidelines. Part I also
explains how courts use contract principles to interpret plea
agreements and discusses the prevailing standards of review of
prosecutorial discretion retained in plea agreements. Part II
analyzes the shortcomings of the existing approaches and proposes a standard that would safeguard the constitutional and
contractual rights of defendants and would restore balance to
the sentencing process. This Note concludes that courts should
apply an objective good faith standard to a prosecutor's refusal
to file a substantial assistance motion pursuant to a plea
agreement.

10. After Wade, no defense attorney would likely advise a client to cooperate with the government without the benefit of a plea agreement. David Fisher,
FifthAmendment-ProsecutorialDiscretionNot Absolute: ConstitutionalLimits On Decision Not To File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 J. CRIa. L. &
CRMI NOLOGY 744, 771 (1993). Consequently, Wade offers little precedential
value to lower courts in cases involving plea agreements, which "leaves lower
courts in a quagmire." Id. at 770. Fisher also maintains that the Supreme
Court did not effect positive change in Wade due to the Court's failure to address significant issues and due to the "lack of clarity and specificity" in the
standards created. Id. at 758.
11. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. For a survey of cooperation agreements, see generally Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in
Criminal Cases, 45 VA-D. L. REv. 1 (1992).
13. See supra note 8; infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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I. DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINES

A.

THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission 14 ("Sentencing Commission") addressed the perceived problems of indeterminate sentencing' 5 by implementing the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 16 Congress hoped to create a fair and efficient sentencing process that would curb unwarranted disparity in federal sentencing. 17 Accordingly, the Sentencing Reform Act
identifies three primary goals in restructuring the federal senuniformity,' 8 proportionality, 19 and honesty in
tencing process:
20
sentencing.
The Sentencing Guidelines apply to the most frequently occurring federal offenses. 2 1 The Guidelines attach a base offense
14. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988), established the United
States Sentencing Commission. The Sentencing Commission developed the
Sentencing Guidelines and now stands as a permanent body committed to monitoring sentencing practices. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A cmt.
15. Under indeterminate sentencing, federal judges had broad discretion to
fashion sentences with little or no review, resulting in disparate sentences for
similarly situated individuals. Parole commissions often diluted the sentence
and "resentenced the defendant according to [their] own set of rules." U.S. SENTENCING CONMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMWM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES].
16. Although the Guidelines officially became law in November 1987, constitutional challenges to the Guidelines prevented their consistent application
until January 1989. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYsTEM AND
SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DIsPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1991) [hereinafter OPERA-

TION REPORT]. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Supreme
Court broadly affirmed the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 1, pt. A(3)
cmt.; William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline
Amendments in Reducing UnwarrantedSentencing Disparity,50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV.63, 64 (1993) (explaining that increasing fairness and uniformity in sentencing constituted the most important objectives).

18. Congress sought to narrow disparity by ensuring uniform sentences for
similarly situated criminals, those with similar records convicted of similar
criminal conduct. MANDATORY MINIMM PENALTIES, supra note 15, at 17.

19. Congress wanted the Guidelines to accurately gauge the severity of
criminal conduct. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 1, pt. A(3) cmt. Other goals
include deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2) (1988).
20. Congress sought to avoid "the confusion and implicit deception" of indeterminate sentencing. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 1, pt. A(3) cmt.
21. The Sentencing Guidelines apply to over ninety percent of all federal
felony and Class A misdemeanor cases. Id. at ch. 1, pt. A(5) cmt. The federal
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level to each offense and rank offense categories according to severity. 22 Sentencing courts may adjust the offense level for aggravating or mitigating factors. 23 After ascertaining the
defendant's criminal history, 2 4 the sentencing court determines
the appropriate sentencing range from the sentencing table,
which contains a grid comprised of forty-three offense levels and
six criminal history categories. 25 The court has discretion to
26
choose the sentence from any point within the range.

code also imposes mandatory minimum sentences on more than 100 offenses.
See Stephen Schulhofer, Rethinking MandatoryMinimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 199, 201 (1993). Four types of offenses account for more than 90% of all
mandatory minimum convictions: manufacturing or distributing controlled
substances, possessing a mixture containing a cocaine base, importing or exporting controlled substances, and the sentence enhancement for using or carrying a firearm during certain drug or violent crimes. HENRY R. WRAY, U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: ARE THEY BEING
IMPOSED AND WHO IS RECEIVING THEM? TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMIrIs. ON
CRIME AND CRIINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 3-4 (1993)

[hereinafter WRAY TESTIMONY] (summary statement by Mr. Wray, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, GAO). Courts sentence offenders under the
Guidelines unless the Guideline sentence is lower than the statutorily required
minimum sentence. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5G1.1. A recent General Accounting Office report found that sentencing courts impose the Guidelines sentencing range in approximately 70% of drug cases, most of them involving drug
trafficking offenses. WRAY TESTIMONY, supra, at 14-15, app. at 21.

22. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 2.
23. See id. at ch. 3. Sentencing courts adjust the base offense level for Victim-Related Adjustments, id. at ch. 3, pt. A; Role in the Offense, id. at ch. 3, pt.
B; Obstruction, id. at ch. 3, pt. C; Multiple Counts, id. at ch. 3, pt. D; and Acceptance of Responsibility, id. at ch. 3, pt. E. Under § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines,
the sentencing court decreases the offense level by two levels if the defendant
clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for the offense. Id. § 3EL.(a).
The court also may decrease the offense level by one additional level if the defendant assists in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct. Id.
§ 3ELl(b). The Sentencing Commission specifically differentiates between acceptance of responsibility deductions and departures outside the Guidelines for
substantial assistance. Id. § 5K1.1 cmt. n.2.
24. The sentencing court consults U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 4, to determine the Criminal History Category.
25. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 5, pt. A. The intersection of the vertical
axis, the Offense Level, and the horizontal axis, the Criminal History Category,
provides the Guideline range in months of imprisonment. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A n.1.
For step-by-step instructions in determining the appropriate sentence under
the Guidelines, see id. § 1B1.1.
26. Id. § 5G1.l(c). Generally, as a matter of federal law, the maximum sentencing range for imprisonment may not exceed the minimum of the range by
more than 25%. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988).
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SUBSTANTLAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES

The Sentencing Guidelines also contain provisions by which
a sentencing court may depart from the Guidelines. 2 7 The Sentencing Commission believes that the proper use of a court's departure authority is critical to the successful implementation of
the Guidelines. 2 8 Substantial assistance motions, the most important exception to Guideline sentencing,2 9 permit sentencing
courts to depart from the Guidelines when a defendant cooperates with the government in other cases.3 0 Substantial assistance departures account for over two-thirds of all departures

27. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 5, pt. K.
28. OPERATION REPORT, supra note 16, at 25.
29. Courts cited substantial assistance as a reason in 71.6% of all downward departures in 1992. 1992 AxNuAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 122. In addition to the substantial assistance departure, U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1, courts may base
a sentencing departure on aggravating or mitigating circumstances that the
Sentencing Commission has not considered adequately. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1988); U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K2.0. Courts also have discretion to depart
upward, although they did so in only 1.5% of all cases in 1992. 1992 ANNuAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 127; see U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K2.
30. This provision ensures that mandatory sentences will not impede defendants' cooperation and creates powerful incentives for defendants to assist
the government. Commentators criticize the § 5Kl.1 departure, however, on
fairness grounds because the imposed sentence bears little relationship to culpability. See, e.g., John D.B. Lewis, Cooperation Under The Guidelines, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 30, 1993, at 2 (arguing that reducing "the dispensing ofjustice to a
crass exchange of information for sentencing clemency" creates enormous suffering and produces no countervailing benefits). In fact, a defendant who plays
a major role in a crime, with a high level of knowledge and responsibility, can
negotiate a departure more easily than minor participants. See Schulhofer,
supra note 21, at 211-13. Substantial assistance departures also create "serious
inherent incentives to peijury." Rankin, supra note 9, at Al (quoting U.S. District Judge Vincent Broderick).
At the same time, minor participants in multi-defendant drug and fraud
conspiracy cases are subject to the same sentence as the most culpable co-defendants. L. Felipe Restrepo, To Be or Not To Be a CooperatingDefendant,
CRum. JUST., Winter 1993, at 22, 25.
[T]here are few federal judges who have not had the disheartening experience of seeing major players in crimes immunize themselves from
harsh mandatory minimum sentences by blowing the whistle on their
minions, while the low-level offenders find themselves sentenced to the
tough terms that the kingpin so skillfully avoided.
Barefoot Sanders & Vincent Broderick, Mandatory Sentences Are Unfair, DAILAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 18, 1993, at 15A.
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from the Guidelines, 3 1 and their use has more than quadrupled

from 1989 to 1992.32

Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
provides that "[ulpon motion of the government stating that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the Guidelines." 33 Similarly,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) permits courts to depart from the applicable
statutory mandatory minimum sentence based on substantial
assistance.3 4 All but one circuit have concluded that these two
31. See 1992 AaNuAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 120-21. In fiscal year 1992,
trial courts sentenced outside of the Guidelines in 22.6% of all cases. See id. at
120. Departure rates vary markedly by offense type. Id. at 130. Offenses with
high substantial assistance departure rates include bribery (31.1%), gambling
and lottery (30.9%), drug trafficking (25.6%), money laundering (22.2%), and

racketeering and extortion (20.1%). Id. at 130-31.
One judge, however, claims that no reliable statistics are available on departures due to the Sentencing Commission's method of counting substantial
assistance departures. Stanley Marcus, SubstantialAssistance Motions: What

Is Really Happening?, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 6, 6 (1993). The Commission
counts substantial assistance motions only if the government files the motion
before sentencing; usually, however, prosecutors file substantial assistance motions long after the court imposes the sentence. Id. Judge Marcus concludes
that "better than half-and probably a much higher percentage-of all downward departures are being made for reasons that are often wholly unclear, not
stated in the open record, and altogether uncaptured by statistics." Id. at 7.
Other courts, however, recognize and award § 5K1.1 departures only if the
government files its motion prior to sentencing. These courts conclude that
§ 5K1.1 does not apply to a defendant's assistance rendered subsequent to sentencing. United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1991); United States
v. Howard, 902 F.2d 894, 897 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Francois, 889
F.2d 1341, 1345 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1085 (1990). These
courts recognize and reward cooperation subsequent to sentencing pursuant to
a Federal Rule 35(b) motion only. Rule 35(b) provides the following: "The
court, on motion of the Government made within one year after the imposition
of the sentence, may reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent, substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense...." FED. R. CImN. P. 35(b).
32. Myrna S. Raeder, Gender Issues in the FederalSentencing Guidelines
and MandatoryMinimum Sentences, Canm. JusT., Fall 1993, at 20, 61. The rising rate in downward departures from 1989 to 1992 for substantial assistance
constitutes the "most dramatic change in the national departure rate." 1992
ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 121. While the entire sentenced population
grew by only 15%, substantial assistance motions increased by 45%. Raeder,
supra, at 64.
33. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1. Before 1989, the standard for a
§ 5K1.1 motion was a "good faith effort" to provide assistance. In 1989, the
Commission deleted the "good faith effort" clause, suggesting that a departure
requires something more than just the willingness of the defendant to provide
substantial assistance. Id. app. C, amend. 290.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). The section provides the following:
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provisions perform the same function and do not constitute separate and distinct methods of departure. 35
The prosecutor alone has the power to move for a substantial assistance departure; a sentencing court cannot depart on
its own authority.3 6 The court, however, determines the appropriate sentencing reduction and has full authority to deny a substantial assistance motion.3 7 The trial court determines
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to
impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum
sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the
guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.
Id. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988) similarly provides the following:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general
appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be
imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by
statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.
Id.
35. U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1 provides for departures below the Guidelines; 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) provides for departures below the statutory mandatory minimum. Only the Eighth Circuit differentiates between the two departure motions. Compare United States v. Beckett, 996 F.2d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that a direct statutory relationship exists between § 5K1.1 and
§ 3553(e) that makes § 5K1.1 the appropriate method by which courts may implement § 3553(e)); United States v. Cheng Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490, 493-94 (2d
Cir. 1991); United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1991) with
United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 958 F.2d 1441, 1443 (8th Cir.) (requiring
§ 3553(e) motion rather than § 5K1.1 motion for departure below a statutory
minimum), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 375 (1992). The United States Supreme
Court acknowledged the circuit split in Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840,
1843 (1992), but did not resolve the issue because the facts in Wade implicated
both § 3553(e) and § 5Kl.1. Id. at 1843. The Supreme Court previously suggested that it will look to the Sentencing Commission to resolve circuit splits
before granting certiorari on a disputed issue. Braxton v. United States, 111 S.
Ct. 1854, 1858 (1991).
36. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1843.
37. United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (1st Cir. 1993). The
Guidelines state, however, that "[substantial weight should be given to the
government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and the value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain."
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1 cmt. n.3.
Sections 3553(e) and 5K1.1 have withstood preliminary constitutional challenges. For example, courts have rejected the argument that these sections violate the constitutionally required separation of powers. See, e.g., United States
v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990).
In addition, courts uniformly have held that because the government motion
requirement does not invalidly circumscribe judicial sentencing discretion in
individualized sentencing, the requirement does not violate due process requirements. See, e.g., United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st
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whether a defendant's assistance deserves a departure based on
the following factors:
1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant
or his family resulting from his assistance;
38
5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.

A sentencing court has wide discretion concerning both the
decision to depart and the extent of the departure.3 9 In general,
once the trial court establishes the basis for a downward departure, no limits exist as to the extent of the departure, except for
express statutory prohibitions. 4 0 A defendant cannot appeal
either the trial court's refusal to depart 4 ' or the extent of the
departure. 42 In practice, however, courts rarely deny the prose43
cutor's substantial assistance motion.
Prosecutors dispense substantial assistance motions unevenly, largely because United States Attorney's Offices inconsistently define "substantial assistance."44 Consequently, the
Cir. 1990). Courts also have held that giving prosecutors unbridled discretion
under § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 to decide whether to make substantial assistance
motions does not violate due process. See, e.g., Huerta, 878 F.2d at 93-94.
38. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1. The sentencing court may consider
factors other than those enumerated. See id. § 5K1.1(a). At least one court has
held that a trial court may recognize mitigating concerns only to the extent they
relate to a defendant's substantial assistance. United States v. Mariano, 983
F.2d 1150, 1156 (1st Cir. 1993).
39. E.g., United States v. Damer, 910 F.2d 1239, 1240-41 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990).
40. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 896 F.2d 856,859-60 (4th Cir. 1990). Appellate courts may review departures for reasonableness only. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e)(3) (1988).
41. United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (collecting
cases). Parties may appeal the decision, however, when the trial court misapprehended the rules governing departure. E.g., Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1153.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1990).
43. Restrepo, supra note 30, at 25. A General Accounting Office report
found that in seven out of eight judicial districts reviewed, sentencing courts
granted a substantial assistance departure to "most or all defendants who received a substantial assistance motion." WAY TESTimONY, supra note 21, at 6,
app. at 18.
44. Some United States Attorney's offices have no formal definition of what
qualifies as "substantial assistance." Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A
Tale of Three Cities: An EmpiricalStudy of Chargingand BargainingPractices
under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 522-23, 541
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use of substantial assistance motions varies greatly district by

(1992). In one district, the definition of substantial assistance varies "according
to the extent to which the AUSA [Assistant United States Attorney] considers
the defendant sympathetic." Id. at 522-23. In the United States Attorney's office in another district, a contradictory policy directive states that cooperation
must result in additional charges or convictions and that the prosecutor should
make the substantial assistance motion "once the defendant does everything he
is called up to do." Id. at 531. This district had twice the national average of
substantial assistance motions. Prosecutors there circumvented the Guidelines
to deliver the sentences they thought individual defendants deserved. Id. In
another district, the AUSAs "seldom used" the substantial assistance motion
because prosecutors preferred charge reduction to lock in sentence exposure,
and defense attorneys were "aggrieved by some AUSAs refusal to submit section 5K1.1 motions after cooperation was allegedly rendered." Id. at 541.
Further, the circuits do not agree on a definition of "substantial assistance." For example, one court has stated that a defendant's readiness to perform may be enough to constitute substantial assistance. United States v.
Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the government
must move for downward departure if defendant, in reliance on plea, did his
part or stood ready to perform but was unable to do so because the government
had no further need or opted not to use him). Another court reasoned that
when defendants do all that the agreement requires, the government should
move for a substantial assistance departure. United States v. Knights, 968
F.2d 1483, 1488-89 (2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that if defendant did all that the
plea agreement asks of him, he has kept his half of the agreement, and the
government could not in good faith refuse to keep its half). Another court concluded that substantial assistance means actual assistance in the prosecution of
another defendant; good faith cooperation is not enough. United States v.
Donatiu, 922 F.2d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that the government's
decision not to move for departure was reasonable when defendant's information was not new or helpful).
Consequently, one court suggested that the government should clarify
what it means by substantial assistance in the plea agreement. United States
v. Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling against defendant's interpretation of "substantial assistance," but nevertheless concluding that "[tihe
government should not take advantage of a defendant's ignorance of the
caselaw on substantial assistance to mislead him into believing it will make the
motion if he cooperates"). One judge, searching case law for a consistent meaning for substantial assistance, reported finding "little that explicated the meaning of 'substantial assistance' under 5K1.1, even after five years of Sentencing
Guidelines and substantial assistance motions." Marcus, supra note 31, at 6.
At least one circuit court has held that substantial assistance departures
are appropriate when the defendant provides assistance to the judicial system
as well as to the government. United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125, 127-28 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that departure without motion possible for assistance to the
judiciary although not for assistance to the prosecutor). Most other circuits reject the holding in Garcia. E.g., United States v. Goroza, 941 F.2d 905, 908 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a government motion is required); United States v.
Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Chotas, 913
F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 950 (1991); United
States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691, 695 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
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district.4 5 Moreover, racial 4 6 and gender 4 7 disparities exist. In-

consistencies also result when prosecutors make substantial
assistance motions for motives other than the quality of assistance, for example, to induce guilty pleas, to benefit sympathetic
defendants, or to mitigate sentences prosecutors perceive as too
harsh.48 As a result, prosecutors increasingly have used sub49
stantial assistance motions for cases that should not qualify.
45. WRAY TESTImONY, supra note 21, at 6. In some districts "the requirements were stringent, in others liberal." Id. at 16. For example, in 1992, the
D.C. Circuit had an aggregate departure rate of 12.1%, while the Third Circuit
had an aggregate departure rate of 38.2%. 1992 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 2,
at 127. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which is in the Third Circuit,
48.8% of all defendants sentenced under the Guidelines received a substantial
assistance departure. Id. Other districts with overall departure rates above
40% include Arizona and the Western District of North Carolina. Id. at 126. In
stark contrast, Eastern Virginia, Western Arkansas, and Eastern Oklahoma
had departure rates below 7%. Id. One commentator concludes that "[t]he inference of pervasive discretion, with sharp disparities in its application, is
strong." Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 220.
46. The Guidelines have increased racial disparity in sentencing for drug
offenses. Judy Clarke, Conference on the FederalSentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE L.J. 2053, 2060 (1992). Prosecutors frequently
use "substantial assistance motions to cloak leniency for 'sympathetic' (usually
white) defendants." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Sentencing Issues Facingthe New
Departmentof Justice, 5 FED. SENT. R. 225, 229 (1993). Reports on the effect of
the Sentencing Guidelines also suggest that the race of the defendant affects
the length of the sentence; courts are more likely to grant departures to white
defendants. MANDATORY MnuMm PENALTms, supra note 15, at ii; see also William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing
Apples and Oranges, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 405, 407-09 (1992) (discussing higher
penalties for sale of crack, which black, inner-city dealers more often sell, than
for sale of cocaine).
47. In United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 817 F. Supp. 812 (D. Ariz. 1993),
the court held that the United States Attorney's Office discriminated on the
basis of gender in forming plea agreements. Id. at 819. For example, over onethird of females received straight probation for drug-related offense, while only
eleven percent of males received probation. Id. at 815. In Redondo-Lemos, the
United States Attorney's Office failed to meet its burden in rebutting the prima
facie showing of discriminatory impact. As a result, the court gave the male
defendants the benefit of the plea bargain they would have received but for the
discrimination. Id. at 819.
48. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 550-51. Furthermore, such circumvention goes "largely unchecked by judges" who oppose the Guidelines or
the Guideline range. OPERATION REPORT, supra note 16, at 17; see also WRAY
TESTrMONY, supra note 21, at 8-9 (reporting that judges in the eastern district of
New York "generally disliked" sentencing low-level offenders to mandatory
minimums).
49. The discretionary features of mandatory minimum sentences result in
evasion of the mandatory minimum in 30 to 50% of cases in which mandatory
minimum sentences apply. Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 220.
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Despite the potential for prosecutorial abuse, in Wade v.
United States,50 the Supreme Court recently held that sentencing courts may make a substantial assistance departure only on
motion by the government. 5 1 The Court also held that courts
cannot review the government's refusal to file a substantial
assistance motion unless the refusal is based on a constitutionally impermissible motive or is not rationally related to any legitimate government end.5 2 The Court reasoned that the
decision to bring a substantial assistance motion resembles any
other discretionary decision of the prosecutor. 53 The Supreme
Court specifically noted, however, that Wade did not involve a
plea agreement.5 4 Consequently, federal courts disagree about
whether Wade controls in cases in which defendants bargain for
and rely on the government's promise in a plea agreement to
make a substantial assistance motion if warranted by the assist55
ance rendered.
C.

PLEA AGREEMENTS

UNDER THE GUIDELINES

Defendants enter guilty pleas in almost ninety percent of

Guidelines cases, 5 6 and many pleas involve some form of agreement with the government. 5 7 Even though the Sentencing Commission did not intend to institute major changes in plea

agreement practices, 58 in reality prosecutors have gained significant power in plea bargaining under the Guidelines. 59 Prosecu50. 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992).
51. Id. at 1843. In 1993, the Sentencing Commission considered and rejected an amendment that would allow courts to depart on their own without a
motion by the government. Deborah Pines, Amendments Approved to Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 1993, at 1. One circuit has held, however,
that when the government refuses to make a substantial assistance motion,
breaching a plea agreement, the district court may sentence the defendant below the mandatory minimum without a motion by the government. United
States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1993).
52. Wade, 112 S.Ct at 1843-44. The court concluded that a defendant must
make a "substantial threshold showing" of impermissible motive to advance a
right of discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1844. A defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement with a mere generalized allegation. Id.
53. Id. at 1843.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 8.
56. 1992 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 54.
57. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 1, pt. A(4)(c) cmt.
58. Id.
59. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 504-05, 561. The Sentencing
Guidelines granted prosecutors new authority and power, but imposed no corresponding accountability. United States v. Jones, 983 F.2d 1425, 1433 n.12 (7th
Cir. 1993). Both Congress and the Sentencing Commission considered plea bar-
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tors have substantial discretion in negotiating plea
agreements, 60 which creates a significant danger for abuse of
prosecutorial power. 61 In practice, prosecutors circumvent the
Guidelines 62 through plea agreements in twenty to thirty-five
percent of all cases involving pleas. 6 3 Prosecutors typically mismaking
use their power to benefit defendants by surreptitiously
64
unwarranted substantial assistance motions.

gaining a threat to the success of the Guidelines. Nagel and Schulhofer, supra
note 44, at 502. Accordingly, a preliminary study concluded that prosecutorial
discretion, "[ilf abused and unchecked... has the potential to create the disparities that sentencing reform was intended to prevent." Id. at 503. Moreover,
manipulative plea bargaining and Guidelines circumvention may increase over
time as commitment to the goals of the Guidelines decreases. David N. Yellen,
Two Cheers ForA Tale Of Three Cities, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 567, 571 (1992).
The Clinton administration recently granted prosecutors even greater discretionary power in plea bargaining. On October 12, 1993, Attorney General
Janet Reno issued a directive to United States Attorneys which gives them discretion to consider a range of subjective factors in determining what charges to
bring and whether to plea bargain. Daniel Klaidman, Reno Brings Back the
Plea Bargain, LEGAL TImES, Nov. 15, 1993, at 1. In the directive Reno states
that "a faithful and honest application of the Sentencing Guidelines is not incompatible with selecting charges or entering into plea agreements on the basis
of an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the
specific circumstances of the case." Id. Reno's directive received praise for tempering the sentencing process with mercy, although even more disparity and
arbitrariness seems likely. Id.
60. Nagel & Schuhofer, supra note 44, at 544. Procedures for review exist,
but they are "not rigorously implemented." Id. at 545. Research of plea negotiation practices reveals that "[pirocedures for Guideline training of newly hired
AUSAs are inadequate, as are procedures for ensuring that career AUSAs
master the Guidelines." Id. at 546.
61. Id. at 501-02. One district court judge contends that "[m]ercy is not
always given-it is sold or extracted," and claims to have seen "a few terrorists"
among federal prosecutors. Rankin, supra note 9, at Al (quoting United States
District Judge Avant Edenfield). Judges generally are reluctant to disrupt the

plea process.

OPERATION REPORT,

supra note 16, at 24. Yet, the Sentencing

Commission expects courts to examine plea agreements for prosecutors' abuse
of discretion. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at ch. 6, pt. B cmt.
62. Prosecutors circumvent the Sentencing Guidelines by engaging in bargaining over facts (changing the amount or nature of the drug), Guidelines-factor bargaining (ignoring or reducing the individual's role in the crime), limiting
proof (limiting the evidence to be considered in prosecuting a case), bringing
less severe alternative charges, and using substantial assistance motions improperly. WRAY TESTIMONY, supra note 21, at 9-10; Marcia Chambers, Sua
Sponte, NAT'L L.J., June 7, 1993, at 13. Commentators condemn Guideline circumvention because it "is hidden and unsystematic ... and forecloses oversight
and obscures accountability." Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 557.
63. Chambers, supra note 62, at 13.
64. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 522-23.
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Although prosecutors have higher ethical obligations than
other lawyers, 65 prosecutors find themselves "increasingly immune to ethical restraints" 66 and "virtually immune from judicial review." 6 7 One court justifies the minimal scrutiny of
prosecutors' conduct in plea bargaining by reasoning that builtin institutional safeguards protect defendants, who will refuse
to cooperate with prosecutors who act unfairly.68 Yet prosecutors and defendants possess unequal bargaining power. 69 Because of the harshness of many Guideline sentences, a defense
attorney in a multi-defendant case feels compelled to explore
every possibility for a departure70 and "may feel compelled to
beat his or her colleagues to the prosecutor's door to cut a
7
deal." 1
65. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393,
405 n.41 (1992). Public prosecutors play a dual role in the judicial process.
They represent the adversarial element in a proceeding against a particular
defendant. Unlike most criminal defense attorneys, however, prosecutors also
represent the government, thereby committing themselves to the pursuit of
"impartial justice" and the fairest, though not necessarily most severe, sentence. United States v. Jones, 983 F.2d 1425, 1433 n.13 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1218 (1958)); see also United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1340 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding government to a high standard of fair dealing in view of its duty
to "serve truth and justice first" (quoting United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315,
1323 (9th Cir. 1993))); MODEL RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 3.8 cmt.
(1992) (concluding that a "prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not simply that of an advocate").
66. Gershman, supra note 65, at 393; see id. at 443-48 (discussing prosecutors' exemption from ethical restraints).
67. Id. at 406. At the same time, the Supreme Court demands higher ethical standards for defense counsel but imposes lower standards for their competence and loyalty. Id. at 404 n.72.
68. United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 969 (1990). The court notes that the government has a substantial interest
in encouraging cooperation through plea agreements. If the government "fails
to exercise its discretion fairly and even-handedly, valuable information and
assistance will be lost, because defendants may come to regard its prosecutors
as untrustworthy and simply refuse to cooperate with them." Id.
69. See United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993).
Critics of plea bargaining charge that defendants often accept prosecutors' offers under duress and that many of the bargains are unconscionable. Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1918 (1992).
70. For example, Carol A. Brook, Deputy Director of the Federal Defender
Program in Chicago, asserts the following: "You can't take a Guidelines case
without thinking how you're going to argue for a [downward] departure. The
stakes are too high." John Flynn Rooney, Federal Sentencing Guides Susceptible to Reason, Creativity, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 10, 1993, at 1.
71. Daniel J. Sears, Practice Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
BargainingForFreedom,22 COLO.LAw. 485,485 (1993). Cooperation pursuant
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CONSEQUENCES OF A PLEA AGREEMENT

Defendants incur risks and surrender rights when entering
into a cooperation agreement with the government. For example, a cooperating defendant "assumes potentially onerous and
protracted obligations" to the government.7 2 Potential hazards
of cooperating include the following: betraying friends and family by testifying against them, risking retribution, and endangering family members. 7 3 Moreover, a defendant gives up
constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea. 74 Accordingly,
the Constitution requires that defendants waive constitutional
rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 75 Prosecutors
to a guilty plea frequently represents the only alternative a defendant has to a
long prison sentence. Restrepo, supra note 30, at 51. Prosecutors, on the other
hand, sometimes can get the same or similar information from other defendants
in a multi-defendant case. Defendants must decide whether to cooperate very
early in the proceedings, usually before discovery. Id. at 24. The Sentencing
Commission clearly intended mandatory minimums to encourage offenders to
provide cooperation "because cooperation... is the only statutorily-recognized
way to permit the court to impose a sentence" below the mandatory minimum.
MANDATORY MNIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 15, at 14 (citation omitted). Conversely, courts may not consider a defendant's refusal to cooperate as an aggravating sentencing factor. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.2.
72. Hughes, supra note 12, at 3. Obligations will "at least include interviews and debriefings and may involve undercover action or observation and
reporting back." Id.
73. Lewis, supra note 30, at 2; Restrepo, supra note 30, at 24-25. In addition, the New York Times reports a "trend" among drug gangs in Manhattan to
kill witnesses to their crimes who cooperate with prosecutors. Witnesses Being
Put at Risk by Gangs, ProsecutorsSay, N.Y. TIm~s, Nov. 22, 1993, at A12.
74. For example, a defendant admits all elements of the charged crime and
relinquishes the right to go to trial. John J. Farley, Guilty Pleas, 81 GEO. L.J.
1184, 1193-95 (1993). In addition, a defendant waives nonjurisdictional constitutional rights and might waive the right to challenge prosecutorial defects. Id.
See generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (listing fundamental rights waived by guilty plea); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CmsmUAL PROCEDURE § 21.6(a) (2d ed. 1992)

(same).
75. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."). The government's breach of a plea agreement raises the question of whether the plea was "knowingly and voluntarily made." Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.8 (1977). Similarly, when a prosecutor does not inform defendants of the probable consequences of the plea bargain, the plea is
not intelligently made. Peter Westen & David Westin, A ConstitutionalLaw of
Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains,66 CAL. L. REv. 471, 504 (1978). Either the
prosecutor or the defendant may opt out of the plea at any time before the defendant performs. An exception to this general rule exists when the defendant
acts to his substantial detriment in reliance on the prosecutor's promise. See
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 506 (1984).
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have a duty to make the circumstances and consequences of a
plea bargain known 7 6 so that defendants can make an informed
choice about7 whether to plead guilty and cooperate with
7
government.
E. APPLICATION OF CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO PLEA BARGAINS
The Supreme Court has analogized plea agreements to contracts. In Santobello v. New York, 78 the Court held that "when a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of
the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."7 9 Consequently, every federal circuit uses principles of contract law to
interpret plea agreements.8 0 Federal circuits also consistently
use contract principles to review government refusals to file sub81
stantial assistance motions pursuant to plea agreements.
76. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 n.6.
77. Westen & Westin, supra note 75, at 504.
78. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
79. Id. at 262.
80. United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir.) (concluding
that a plea agreement is a form of contract), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 322 (1992);
United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) (analyzing plea
agreements under contract law standards attended by safeguards to ensure
rights of defendant); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613-14 (6th Cir.
1991) (interpreting and enforcing plea agreements pursuant to traditional contract law principles); United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990)
(interpreting plea agreements with principles borrowed from contract law, but
recognizing that criminal sentencing proceedings differ from civil contract disputes), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1606 (1991); United States v. Oleson, 920 F.2d
-538, 542 (8th Cir. 1990) (analogizing plea agreements to contracts, but concluding that due process concerns require deviation from normal commercial contract law principles); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1446 (10th
Cir. 1990) (using contract principles to govern interpretation of plea agreements); United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990) (likening interpretation of plea agreements to interpretation of contracts, while
protecting rights of defendant); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1071
(7th Cir.) (applying ordinary contract principles to decide existence or meaning
of agreement), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 843 (1990); United States v. Sutton, 794
F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986) (measuring plea agreement by contract law
standards); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying contract law tempered by constitutional concerns and perceived fairness in
administration of justice); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 179 (1st
Cir. 1985) (applying contract law to plea bargains as long as application will
ensure defendants what is reasonably due in the circumstances); United States
v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that principles of contract law provide a useful analytical framework for interpreting a plea bargain,
but noting critical role of trial court in process), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984
(1981).
81. E.g., United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1499 n.2 (11th Cir. 1993)
(discussing general application of contract principles in other circuits to govern-
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Courts finding that the government breached a plea agreement
may grant specific performance
or permit withdrawal of the
82
guilty plea by the defendant.
Although courts uniformly apply principles of contract law
to plea agreements, most courts recognize that principles of contract law "cannot be blindly incorporated into the criminal
law."8 3 Because the contractual rights of criminal defendants in
84
a plea agreement are fundamental and constitutionally-based,
courts usually temper contract principles with "safeguards to insure the defendant [receives] what is reasonably due in the circumstances."8 5 For example, courts do not employ a "rigidly6
8
literal construction of the language" of a plea agreement.
Many courts hold the government to a higher standard and
greater degree of responsibility in interpreting unclear lanment's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion). For an argument that
courts should apply criminal law principles rather than contract law to plea
bargains and cooperation agreements, see 1 ARTmuu L. Comm, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 150 (1992 Supp.). This treatise contends that the obligations of the
parties in a cooperation agreement are "largely illusory" because the parties
cannot control the results of their performances. The defendant cannot ensure
that his assistance will yield results and the government cannot ensure that the
court will enforce the plea bargain and grant the sentencing concession. Id.
82. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring). Courts "ought to
accord a defendant's preference considerable, if not controlling, weight inasmuch as the fundamental rights flouted by a prosecutor's breach of a plea bargain are those of the defendant, not of the State." Id.; see also LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 74, § 21.6(d).
Several appellate courts conduct a de novo review of district court determinations of violations of plea agreements. E.g., United States v. Valencia, 985
F.2d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jiminez, 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991); United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868
F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989). Others conduct review under the clearly erroneous standard. E.g., United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir.
1992); United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076-77 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 420 (1991); Raulerson v. United States, 901 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1337 (7th Cir. 1988). The
burden of proving the breach of a plea agreement rests with the party asserting
the breach. Conner, 930 F.2d at 1076.
83. United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980).
84. E.g., United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the constitutional basis of the defendant's underlying contract right); see
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) (concluding that a breached plea
agreement impairs voluntariness and intelligence of plea).
85. United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
86. United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir. 1990). Courts generally avoid "a hyper-technical" approach, United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d
1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990), particularly when a narrow interpretation would
violate the spirit of the agreement. United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022,
1026 (1st Cir. 1988).
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guage.8 7 Courts also consider what the defendant reasonably
understood when entering into the plea agreement. 8 s
F. EXISTING STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION TO BRING A SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE

MOTION PURSUANT TO A PLEA AGREEMENT

In a plea agreement, to ensure full compliance and cooperation from the defendant, the government may reserve discretion
to bring a substantial assistance motion. Federal circuits disagree, however, on the appropriate standard of review for a prosecutor's refusal to bring a substantial assistance motion pursuant
to a plea agreement.8 9 A growing number of circuits permit review for constitutionally impermissible motivation only, while
other circuits also allow review for allegations of prosecutorial
bad faith.
Six circuits permit review only when the government bases
its refusal to make a substantial assistance motion on an unconstitutional motive, such as race or religion. 90 These courts reason that when the prosecutor retains sole discretion in the plea
agreement over the decision to file a substantial assistance motion, the government makes no explicit promise and therefore
incurs no contractual obligation to the defendant. 9 1 Consequently, these courts hold that no corresponding duty of good
87. Several circuits resolve ambiguities or disputed terms against the government. E.g., United States v. Massey, 997 F.2d 823, 824 (10th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361-63 (3rd Cir. 1989). ContraUnited States
v. Goroza, 941 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Laetividal-Gonzalez, 939 F.2d 1455, 1463 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying objective standards to determine meaning of ambiguous or disputed terms), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280
(1992); United States v. Fields, 766 F.2d 1161, 1168 (7th Cir. 1985). Cf United
States v. Hernandez, 996 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding remand necessary
to determine the intentions of the parties concerning the use of "may" in the
plea agreement).
88. United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 n.1 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hand,
913 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir. 1990). Other courts, however, apply an objective
standard and look to the reasonable expectations of the parties. United States
v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Read, 778 F.2d
1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986).
89. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting split among federal
circuits).
90. See supra note 8 (citing cases).
91. "[T]here can be no ambiguity in the absence of an express government
promise in the plea agreements to file a [substantial assistance] motion .... The
lack of such a promise is clear evidence that such a promise was not made."
United States v. Coleman, 895 F.2d 501, 506 (8th Cir. 1990) (italics omitted).
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faith exists.9 2 Generally, these courts take a restrictive view toward implying sentencing promises into plea agreements, asserting that a substantial assistance departure provides
extraordinary relief and that courts should preserve the government's discretion unless the prosecutor clearly bargains it
away. 93 According to these circuits, the Supreme Court's decision in Wade controls, and courts may review only those decisions in which the defendant makes a threshold showing of
94
constitutionally impermissible motivation.
Courts that review for both constitutionally impermissible
motivation and prosecutorial bad faith 9 5 reason that by bargaining with the defendant and inducing the plea, the government
96
limits its discretion and incurs a valid contractual obligation.
These courts analogize agreements in which the government
reserves discretion to contractual promises conditional on satisfaction. 9 7 Although the government retains discretion under the
92. See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1500 n.2 (l1th Cir. 1993).
This reasoning led to an absurd result in United States v. Favara, 987 F.2d 538
(8th Cir. 1993). In Favara,the defendant offered to provide information about
illegal drug activities in exchange for a substantial assistance motion. Id. at
539. The government told the defendant's attorney that it could not make a
sentencing decision before evaluating the quality of the assistance rendered,
but promised to "deal with [the defendant] in good faith." Id. The defendant
subsequently provided information that led to the recovery of two kilograms of
cocaine, but the government refused to make a substantial assistance motion.
Id. Because it did not make an express promise to move for a departure, the
court held that the government did not restrict its discretion. Id. Consequently, the court refused to review whether the government fulfilled its express promise to deal with the defendant in good faith. Id. at 540.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 940 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 201 (1991).
94. E.g., United States v. Romsey, 975 F.2d 556, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1992).
95. United States v. Profeta, 995 F.2d 306, 1993 WL 185730, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. May 20, 1993) (equating "improper motive" standard of Wade with bad
faith), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 741 (1994); United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d
1554, 1569 (10th Cir. 1992) (limiting court's role to determining whether prosecutor has exercised discretion retained in plea agreement in good faith), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1855 (1993); United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 148687 (2d Cir. 1992) (distinguishing cases involving plea agreement from Wade and
thus permitting good faith review of prosecutorial discretion retained in plea
agreement).
96. "[O]nce the government uses its § 5K1.1 discretion as a bargaining chip
in the plea negotiation process, that discretion is circumscribed by the terms of
the agreement." United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1075 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 420 (1991). Yet a mere promise by the government to inform
the court of the extent and value of the defendants cooperation does not restrict
the government's discretion in bringing a substantial assistance motion. See,
e.g., United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1991).
97. United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1606 (1991). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS
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plea agreement, these courts assert that the prosecutor must exercise this discretion in good faith because of the implicit covenant of good faith in every contract. 9 s A court can review, either
subjectively or objectively, whether the prosecutor has fulfilled
his or her obligation. Applying a subjective good faith standard,
a court will uphold the government's refusal if the prosecutor is
honestly, though unreasonably, dissatisfied with the defendant's
cooperation. 99 Generally, however, in ordinary contract disputes, courts prefer an objective standard: whether a reasonable person in the position of the obligor would be satisfied. 10 0
II. REVIEW OF PLEA AGREEMENTS IN WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT RETAINS DISCRETION TO
BRING A SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
MOTION
A. A GOOD FAITH STANDARD CmcuMSCRIBES PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION

The Sentencing Guidelines grant federal prosecutors new
authority and power, but impose no corresponding accountability.1° 1 Prosecutors frequently make substantial assistance motions that benefit undeserving defendants, while they deny
deserving defendants their expectation and reliance interests
under a plea agreement.' 0 2 Moreover, courts rarely review the
§ 228 (1986); 3A CoRBniN, supra note 81, § 644; 5 WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLisTON ON CONTRACTS § 675A (3d ed. 1961). Courts regularly recognize and uphold

agreements in which a contractor conditions her duty on satisfaction with the
other party's performance. JAEGER, supra, § 675A, at 190.
98. United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.) (recognizing "an
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every contract"), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 969 (1990).
99. Khan, 920 F.2d at 1106 (citing RESTATEMENT (SzcoND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 228 cmt. a). The Second Circuit provided that once a defendant alleges that
he believes the government acted in bad faith, the prosecutor briefly must explain its reasons for refusing to make a downward motion. Id. at 1106. The
court reasoned that a defendant should not have the initial burden to make a
showing of prosecutorial bad faith, because a defendant usually will not have
knowledge of the prosecutor's motivation at that point. Id. The defendant then
must make a threshold showing of bad faith, sufficient to trigger a hearing
under the Guidelines. Id.
100. Rexach, 896 F.2d at 715 (Pierce, J., dissenting) (citing 1A CORBIN,
supra note 81, § 150, at 670). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also explains that if the agreement does not clearly specify honest satisfaction, a court
usually will not assume that the obligee has undertaken the risk of the obligor's
unreasonable, even if honest, dissatisfaction. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CON.
TRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1986).
101. United States v. Jones, 983 F.2d 1425, 1433 n.12 (7th Cir. 1993).
102. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
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exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 10 3 Consequently, prosecutors "are free to be lenient or harsh in particular cases, without
10 4
publicly explaining, let alone defending, their decisions."
This result undermines the Guidelines' goals of uniformity and
05
fairness.'
Courts that review a prosecutor's refusal to make a substantial assistance motion pursuant to a plea agreement only for a
constitutionally impermissible motive' 0 6 fixate on the sanctity
of "the zone of prosecutorial discretion" 0 7 at the expense of the
constitutional' 0 8 and contractual' 0 9 rights of defendants.
Although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not "unfettered."1 10 In Santobello, the Supreme Court noted the benefits
of plea bargaining, but added that "all of these considerations
presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused
and a prosecutor.""' Because a defendant waives constitutional
rights by signing a plea agreement, 1 2 courts have a duty to en13
sure the integrity of the process."
If the plea "was induced by promises, the essence of those
promises must in some way be made known."" l 4 The government cannot evade the intelligence requirement by simply reserving authority to violate its promises. 1 5 If the prosecutor's
discretion remains completely unrestricted by the plea agreement, the defendant lacks an understanding of the likely consequences and thus cannot make an informed choice about
103. See supra notes 59-61, 67 and accompanying text.
104. Testimony of the Presidentof the Federal Judges Association, Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., 6 FED. SENrr. REP. 72, 72 (1993).
105. Willins & Steer, supra note 17, at 64 (noting that uniformity and fairness were primary objectives of Congress).
106. See supra note 8 (citing cases).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1501 n.4 (11th Cir.
1993) ("The Supreme Court emphatically has upheld the sanctity and separateness of prosecutorial discretion for the proper functioning of our criminal justice
system.")
108. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional implications of plea bargains).
109. See supra notes 78-88 (discussing application of contract principles to
plea agreements).
110. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (citation omitted).
111. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
112. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional rights foregone by entering plea agreement).
113. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62.
114. Id.
115. "IT]he state has an affirmative obligation to ascertain and disclose to
the defendant with a reasonable degree of certainty the.., consequences of a
guilty plea." Westen & Westin, supra note 75, at 510.
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whether to cooperate. Although the Supreme Court in Wade
treated a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance mo11 6
tion as it would a prosecutor's other discretionary decisions,
117
When the governWade did not involve a plea agreement.
ment uses its 5K1.1 discretion to induce cooperation from the
defendant, the terms of the plea agreement circumscribe the
prosecutor's discretion. 1 18 Objective good faith review constitutes an essential safeguard that helps ensure defendants receive "what is reasonably due in the circumstances." 1" 9
B.

TO APPLY A GOOD FAITH STANDARD DISREGARDS
THE CoNTRACTuAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS

REFUSING

Traditional contract principles, which all circuits apply to
plea agreements, 20 also support imposing a good faith standard
on prosecutorial discretion retained in plea agreements. When a
defendant agrees to cooperate and places herself at risk by assisting the government pursuant to a plea agreement, 12 1 her
plea rests to a significant degree on the promise of the prosecutor to evaluate her assistance. Courts cannot reasonably conclude that the government offers nothing in exchange for the
cooperation of the defendant, not even a good faith consideration
of the defendant's assistance. 122 The defendant bargains for the
plea to secure a downward departure if her assistance proves to
be "substantial" within the meaning of the Guidelines. The government's promise to evaluate the quality of the defendant's
assistance constitutes consideration for the defendant's promise
to cooperate.
The approach permitting review only for a constitutionally
impermissible motive' 23 ignores contract principles and affords
criminal defendants less protection than courts routinely give
commercial contractors under similar agreements. Plea agreements in which the prosecutor reserves discretion to bring a substantial assistance motion are analogous to contractual
116. Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992).
117. Id.
118. United States v. Dixon, 998 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 1993).
119. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
120. See supra note 80 (citing cases).
121. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing risks that defendants frequently incur in cooperating with the government).
122. United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1340 (9th Cir. 1993).
123. See supra note 8 (citing cases).
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promises conditional on satisfaction. 124 Promises conditional on
satisfaction are "common" in contracts, and "such contracts have
been almost universally upheld." 12 5 Although these agreements
may appear one-sided, courts recognize them as valid contracts
126
due to the implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Because the contractual rights of a criminal defendant under
plea agreements are constitutionally based, 12 7 sentencing courts
have an obligation to ensure that the government has acted in
good faith in refusing to file a substantial assistance motion.
By controlling the terms of a cooperation agreement, the
prosecutor typically attempts to evade review by retaining "sole
and unfettered discretion" to determine whether the defendant's
cooperation merits a substantial assistance departure. 28 One
commentator contends that "[t]aken literally, [such an] agreement is surely unconscionable and a court would not uphold perverse judgments on these matters." 12 9 Courts ordinarily reject
such a literal and "hyper-technical reading" of plea agreements, 130 yet several circuits read these cooperation agreements
literally and cite the prosecutor's "carefully-worded plea agree13
ment" in refusing to impose a good faith standard.'
Courts rejecting a good faith standard place too much emphasis on finding an explicit promise to file a substantial assistance motion in the plea agreement. 13 2 The Eighth Circuit's
124. United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 969 (1991); see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing

the Second Circuit approach). Although the court, not the prosecutor, controls
the ultimate outcome of the sentencing decision, the court has no authority to
depart without a motion by the government. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing courts' impotence in light of the history of the Guidelines
and subsequent judicial interpretation).
125. 5 JAEGER, supra note 97, § 675A, at 189-90.
126. 'Under any interpretation [of a promise conditional on personal satis-

faction], the exercise ofjudgment must be in accordance with the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and for this reason, the agreement is not illusory." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1986) (cross-references omitted). See also supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting the Second Circuit's

recognition of the covenant).
127. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
128. E.g., United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992).
129. Hughes, supra note 12, at 43 n.153.
130. E.g., In re Arnett, 804 F.2d 1200, 1203 (11th Cir. 1986).
131. United States v. Romsey, 975 F.2d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1992).
132. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (noting that for these

courts the existence of an express promise is determinative in finding a contractual obligation). Courts rejecting contractual obligations purport to require an
express promise due to the significance of the sentencing reward. See supra
note 93 and accompanying text (citing cases). Indeed, a departure constitutes

extraordinary relief, but the sentencing court has full authority to deny the gov-
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application of this reasoning led to absurd results, refusing to
review for good faith a prosecutor's oral promise to deal with the
defendant "in good faith," absent an express sentencing promise. 13 3 The government might not make an explicit promise to
make a substantial assistance motion, but a cooperation agreement typically contains an explicit promise to evaluate the quality of the defendant's assistance. 3 4 Because the government
incurs a valid contractual obligation, a1 3 5corresponding duty of
good faith applies to its determination.
C.

A SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH

STANDARD

LEADS TO

INCONSISTENCY AND CONFUSION

Courts that apply a good faith standard to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion pursuant to a plea agreement employ a
subjective standard. 136 For example, in United States v. Kan,
the court concluded that the government had no duty to file a
substantial assistance motion if it was honestly, though unreasonably, dissatisfied with the defendant's cooperation. 13 7 The
subjective good faith standard, however, as currently applied to
cooperation agreements, results in inconsistency and provides
little guidance to sentencing courts. 138 When prosecutors subjectively evaluate the quality of the defendant's assistance, according to the prosecutors' own individual standards, the
ernment's motion if the judge believes that the defendant's cooperation does not
merit a departure. See supranotes 38-42 and accompanying text (noting courts'
broad discretionary power to award sentencing reduction).
133. United States v. Favara, 987 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1993); see supranote 92
(discussing facts of case).
134. Even a court that found no contractual obligation in a plea bargain held
that such a bargain "unequivocally required the government 'to consider... a
5K1.1 motion." United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1500 n.2 (11th Cir. 1993).
The court found that the government must "consider" the defendant's assistance, but did not require it to execute this contractual provision in good faith.
Id.
135. United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 969 (1990).
136. The Second Circuit applies a subjective good faith standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1104-1105 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 969 (1991).
137. Id. at 1105.
138. Assessing the honesty of a federal prosecutor's determination places
sentencing courts in an awkward position. Moreover, courts cannot easily apply the standard. One district court, struggling with the subjective standard,
resorted to a heightened reasonableness standard. United States v. DislaMontano, 1993 WL 541701, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1994) (finding that because
government's position was "not merely unreasonable, but lacked all rational basis," it was not sincere).
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meaning of substantial assistance varies from prosecutor to
prosecutor and a sentencing court cannot meaningfully review
the prosecutor's determination.
Consequently, courts attempt to add consistency by inching
closer to an objective good faith standard. For example, the Second Circuit purports to employ a subjective good faith standard,
but imposes enough additional restrictions to transform it into
more of an objective standard. In United States v. Khan, the
court concluded that the government could not disregard a defendant's cooperation "simply because the defendant is supply13 9
ing information that the government does not want to hear."
Similarly, in United States v. Knights, the court suggested that
once a defendant cooperates fully under a plea agreement, the
government cannot in good faith refuse to move for a downward
departure. 140 These courts thereby rejected the government's
dissatisfaction as unreasonable, while making no evaluation of
the sincerity of the government's dissatisfaction, the only relevant inquiry under a subjective good faith standard. 14 1 Thus,
some courts feel compelled by the need for consistency in sentencing to depart from their own articulated standard.
D.

COURTS SHOULD APPLY AN OBJECTIVE
STANDARD

GOOD FAITH

An explicit objective good faith standard would allow federal
courts the opportunity to impose uniformity in departures despite disparities in requests for departures by prosecutors. If
the prosecutor promised to consider whether the defendant's cooperation constituted substantial assistance, a sentencing court
would review a defendant's allegations of bad faith to determine
whether a reasonable prosecutor would have considered the cooperation sufficiently substantial to make a substantial assistance motion.
Courts prefer when practicable to apply an objective good
faith standard to conditional promises in contracts.' 4 2 Courts
generally use a subjective good faith standard only in contracts
involving such matters as aesthetics or personal fancy, for which
courts cannot easily assess the reasonableness of dissatisfac139. ian,920 F.2d at 1105.
140. United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1488-89 (2d Cir. 1992).
141. See id.
142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that courts apply an
objective standard unless parties contract for a subjective standard).
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tion.143 As one court observed, "Although instances like the allocation of cultural subsidies between ballet and opera may
suggest an almost total absence of articulable rationality, the
decision whether to move for a downward departure is not a
matter of taste."' 44 Section 5K1.1 articulates clear standards
that govern substantial assistance departures, 145 and the Sentencing Commission accordingly directs sentencing courts to review the government's evaluation of the quality of the
defendant's assistance in deciding whether to grant the prosecu146
tor's substantial assistance motion.
Moreover, when interpreting contracts, courts generally apply a "reasonable person" objective standard unless the contract
clearly specifies a subjective standard. 147 The Second Circuit in
its interpretation of a cooperation agreement turned this rule on
its head, stating that it would apply a subjective standard unless the cooperation agreement expressly specifies reasonable
satisfaction or an objective standard. 148 Nevertheless, a subjective good faith standard denies criminal defendants protection
that commercial contractors routinely receive under analogous
agreements.
Because criminal defendants have liberty interests that implicate constitutional concerns, defendants deserve more protec1 49
tion, not less, than ordinary contractors in a civil dispute.
Concerns for the honor and integrity of the government and for
public confidence in the fairness of the process require holding
the government to a higher standard. 150 This higher standard
143. 3A CoRBiN, supra note 81, § 646, at 93.
144. United States v. Rueben, 1994 WL 22572, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21,
1994).
145. See supra text accompanying footnote 38 (enumerating factors).
146. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1; see also United States v. Rexach, 896
F.2d 710, 715 (2d Cir.) (Pierce, J., dissenting) (arguing that plea agreement provides objective standard, namely, whether defendant substantially assisted in
the prosecution or investigation of another person), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 969
(1990).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 228 cmt. a, illus. 2(b) (1986);
3A CORBIN, supra note 81, § 644; 5 JAEGER, supra note 97, § 675 A.
148. United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 969 (1990).
149. E.g., United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that courts should analyze a plea agreement "at a more stringent level
than in a commercial contract because the rights involved are generally fundamental and constitutionally based"); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300
(4th Cir. 1986) (noting that a defendant's rights reflect "concerns that differ
fimdamentally from and run wider than those of commercial contract law").
150. United States v. Garcia, 956 F.2d 41, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1992). Holding
the government to a higher standard also would involve considering what the
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"requires the sovereign to perform its contractual duties with a
sharpened sense of good faith and fair dealing." 151 Holding the
government to a greater degree of responsibility than the dein bargaining power
fendant also helps to redress the disparity
152
and expertise between the parties.
E.

APPLICATION OF THE OBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH STANDARD

The government should make a substantial assistance motion whenever required by a plea agreement, as governed by
principles of contract interpretation, 5 3 whether or not the prosdefendant's cooperation constitutes
ecutor actually believes the
"substantial assistance." 54 If the sentencing court determines
that the assistance was not "substantial," the court need not
grant the motion. 15 5 Using an objective good faith standard
therefore does not contravene the policy behind substantial
assistance departures. In addition, the prosecutor remains free
to inform the court of the extent and usefulness of the defendant's cooperation.' 56 The government also retains discretion
over the extent of the departure it recommends, although again,
the prosecutor's recommendation does not bind the sentencing
court.' 5 7 The court should determine whether the defendant's

assistance justifies a departure, taking into account the factors
defendant reasonably understood when entering into the agreement and interpreting any unclear or vague language against the government. See supra
notes 83-88 and accompanying text (explaining that courts ordinarily employ
safeguards to protect the fundamental rights of defendants).
151. United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1509 (11th Cir. 1993) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
152. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (explaining that prosecutors have greater bargaining power than defendants in negotiating plea
agreements).
153. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing contract principles including applying an objective good faith standard and holding the government to a higher standard in the interpretation of unclear or vague
language).
154. In appropriate circumstances, the government should request a substantial assistance departure if the defendant stands ready to perform, but is
unable to provide assistance because the government chooses not to use him.
United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1991). For example,
the government should bring this motion when the defendant has relied to his
substantial detriment on the plea agreement.
155. See supra notes 37, 39-42 and accompanying text (explaining that the
sentencing court has broad authority concerning whether to depart and in determining the extent of departure).
156. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1 cmt. n.3.
157. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (noting broad discretion
of the trial court); see also Farley, supranote 74, at 1185 (noting that prosecutor
does not have to endorse recommendation enthusiastically).
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enumerated in section 5K1.1.158 The court should give the recommendation of the government considerable weight, but it
should not delegate its sentencing authority to the
159
prosecutor.
When defendants contend that they have provided "substantial assistance" pursuant to a cooperation agreement 1 60 or
allege bad faith by the government in fulfilling the plea agreement, the government should disclose its reasons for refusing to
make the motion. 16 1 Although the party asserting the breach
carries the burden of proof,1 62 a defendant ordinarily has no way
of discerning the prosecutor's motivation in not moving for a departure. 16 3 Courts' failure to require the government to disclose
the basis for its decision should not result in the government
escaping liability for what might amount to bad faith. For example, in one case, the government conceded that the defendant
had cooperated, but argued that the court nevertheless lacked
the authority to review its refusal to make a substantial assistance motion.' 6 4 Further, judicial decisions in other contexts
158. See supra text accompanying note 38 (listing factors that § 5K1.1 directs sentencing courts to consider in making departure decisions).
159. The Guidelines thus provide "the court with the authority to grant a
reduction, with the prosecutor as something of a 'fact finder.'" United States v.
Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1069 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy, J., concurring).
160. The Supreme Court found a defendant's mere contention of substantial
assistance insufficient to trigger a hearing in Wade. Because in plea agreements the government incurs contractual obligations and the defendant develops reliance interests, the decision in Wade, which specifically excepted plea
agreements, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, is inapplicable to such
agreements.
161. The Second Circuit originally articulated this approach. See United
States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1106 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969
(1991); supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing approach). The defendant also has a right to discovery. The government has an "obligation to
produce documents that [the defendant] needs to meet his burden." United
States v. Rueben, 1994 WL 22572, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1994).
162. United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 420 (1991).
163. Khan, 920 F.2d at 1106. To make the requisite threshold showing of a
constitutionally impermissible motive, defendants have a difficult, if not impossible task, in gathering evidence of the prosecutor's subjective motivation. For
example, in United States v. Murry, 1992 WL 336462 (8th Cir. Nov. 18, 1992), a
black defendant asserted that his case was "one of the few in which the 'allwhite prosecutors have refused to file a 5K1.1 motion.'" Id. at *2 (quoting defendant's brief). The court held that such "generalized allegations of improper
motive" do not merit review. Id. (quoting Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1820, 1844 (1992)). As a result, most defendants receive no review at all for a
prosecutor's refusal to make a substantial assistance motion.
164. United States v. Sims, 1992 WL 190909, *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1992)
(per curiam). The appellate court agreed, stating that the grounds that the de-
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of performance for unstated reasons
recognize that a rejection
1 65
faith.
good
violates
Only after the government discloses its reasons for not making a substantial assistance motion should the court require the
defendant to make a threshold showing of bad faith, sufficient to
trigger a hearing. 16 6 When a reasonable dispute exists as to
whether the defendant did in fact provide substantial assistance, the government cannot determine this issue alone; the defendant must have an opportunity to refute the government's
view. Because the defendant bargains for and relies on the plea
agreement, the defendant deserves an explanation of the government's refusal to make the motion.16 7 In a civil contract dispute, a court likely would examine the facts of the case before
permitting one contractor to reject unilaterally the other party's
performance. Sentencing courts similarly should evaluate the
and review the prosecutor's deterfacts presented by both 1sides
68
mination for good faith.
F. A GOOD

FAITH REVIEW Is A PROPER ROLE FOR COURTS

Courts justify limited review of a prosecutor's discretion by
reasoning that prosecutors have institutional incentives to uphold their commitments and encourage cooperation agreements.
Courts reason that defendants will refuse to cooperate with
prosecutors who treat defendants unfairly.' 69 This analysis,
however, ignores the disparity in bargaining power between the
government and the defendant.' 7 0 Due to the severity of
mandatory minimum sentences, prosecutors, through their
power to bring substantial assistance motions, wield enormous
control over sentencing decisions. For a defendant who chooses
not to go to trial, bargaining with the prosecutor normally represents the only possibility for a sentence below the Guidelines
range.171
fendant asserted "amount to no more than assertions that the government acted in bad faith by not moving for departure after she fully abided by the
agreement." Id. at *3.
165. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. e (1986).
166. Khan, 920 F.2d at 1106.
167. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text (noting that defendants place themselves at risk in bargaining for a plea agreement).
168. See supra part H.D (proposing an objective good faith standard).
169. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing perceived existence of inherent safeguards against prosecutorial abuses).
170. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 71 (explaining that the Sentencing Commission intended this result to facilitate cooperation).
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One court implied that reviewing government discretion to
file a substantial assistance motion is "not readily susceptible17to2
the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake."
Section 5K1.1 itself, however, provides clear standards. Courts
readily can assess the defendant's performance by an objective
standard: whether the defendant's cooperation substantially assisted the government "in the investigation or prosecution of another person." 1 73 In addition, the Sentencing Guidelines direct
courts to undertake this same analysis in determining whether
to grant the government's motion, 174 intending that sentencing
courts, not prosecutors, make sentencing reductions.' 7 5 The
Sentencing Commission expressly stated that "sentencing is a
in a guilty
judicial function and that the appropriate sentence
176
plea case is to be determined by the judge."
Critics charge that prosecutors, in spite of the clear language of the Guidelines, 17 7 "have become de facto sentencing
judges." 7 8 Under current practice in many districts, prosecutors decide whether a defendant's assistance deserves a departure and often determine the extent of the departure; the
79
sentencing court usually grants the government's request.'
This process contributes to tremendous disparity in departure
awards and undermines uniformity. Some districts award substantial assistance departures routinely, while other districts
grant them only in exceptional cases.18 0 Although broad
prosecutorial discretion actually benefits many defendants, subjective charging decisions disadvantage defendants who do not
172. United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1501 n.4 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
173. See United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 715 (2d Cir.) (Pierce, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 969 (1990); U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1.
The Sentencing Guidelines further provide a list of factors to consider in the
determination. See supra text accompanying note 38 (enumerating factors).
174. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1.
175. For example, the Sentencing Commission Chairperson argues that critics who charge that sentencing policies transfer sentencing authority from
judges to prosecutors "fail to take into account the multiple features built into
the guideline system to keep the judge in control of sentencing." Testimony of
Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, United States Sentencing Commis-

sion, 6

FED. SENTENCING REPORT

67, 68 (1993).

176. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch. 6, pt. B cmt.
177. Id. § 5K1.1.
178. Testimony of the Presidentof the Federal JudgesAssociation, Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., supra note 104, at 72.
179. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that in practice courts
rarely deny prosecutor's motion).
180. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing
inconsistency).
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appear sympathetic to prosecutors, leading to racial and other
disparities. 18 1 By limiting review and simply following prosecutors' recommendations, courts neglect their duty to make sentencing decisions: 18 2 "The judiciary's unwillingness to set
meaningful limits on the prosecutors... discretion is the principal reason for the prosecutor's dominance over the criminal justice system." 8 3 Sentencing courts have an obligation to review
the refusal of prosecutors to make substantial assistance motions pursuant to plea agreements.
CONCLUSION
Misuse of prosecutorial power constitutes a substantial obstacle to the effectiveness of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Defendants receive downward departures when the Guidelines
do not warrant them, while the government denies departures to
defendants who do in fact provide substantial assistance. A discretionary and sometimes discriminatory system treats similarly situated defendants differently, thus undermining the
goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. This Note proposes that
courts should use principles of contract law to interpret conditional promises by plea agreements. Accordingly, courts would
review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion pursuant to a plea agreement under an objective good faith
standard, rejecting the prosecutor's refusal to make a substantial assistance motion if a reasonable prosecutor would have
been satisfied by the defendant's cooperation. This would lend
fairness and predictability to the process and safeguard the fundamental rights of defendants. Although courts would accord
the recommendations of prosecutors due deference, judges, not
prosecutors, would make the ultimate determination in accordance with Guidelines policy whether to grant a substantial
assistance departure.

181. See supra note 46 (discussing evidence that prosecutors are more likely
to grant sentencing concessions to white defendants).
182. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that courts rarely
deny prosecutor's motion).

183. Gershman, supra note 65, at 441.

